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ABSTRACT 
The Equation (TE) states that the probability of A → B is the probability of B given A 
(Jeffrey, 1964: 702–703). Lewis has shown that the acceptance of TE implies that the 
probability of A → B is the probability of B, which is implausible: the probability of a 
conditional cannot plausibly be the same as the probability of its consequent, e.g., the 
probability that the match will light given that is struck is not intuitively the same as the 
probability that it will light (Lewis, 1976: 299–300). Here I want to counter Lewis’ claim. My 
aim is to argue that: (1) TE doesn’t track the probability of A → B, but instead our 
willingness to employ it on a modus ponens; (2) the triviality result doesn’t strike us as 
implausible if our willingness to employ A → B on a modus ponens implies a similar result; 
(3) TE is still inadequate in this limited role given that some conditionals are only 
employable on a modus tollens or can’t be employed on a modus ponens; (4) TE does not 
have the logical significance that is usually attributed to it, since inferential disposition is a 
pragmatic phenomenon.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper will be divided in two sections. In the first section, I will argue that TE doesn’t 
track the probability of A → B, but instead our willingness to employ it on a modus ponens; 
and that the triviality result doesn’t strike us as implausible if our willingness to employ A → 
B on a modus ponens implies the triviality result. In the second section, I will argue that TE is 
still inadequate in this limited role given that some conditionals are employable only on a 
modus tollens or can’t be employed on a modus ponens; and that TE does not have the logical 
significance that is usually attributed to it, since inferential disposition is a pragmatic 
phenomenon.  
 2. THE RELATION BETWEEN THE EQUATION AND MODUS PONENS  
Our inferential disposition to employ A → B on a modus ponens is measured by Pr(A ⊃ B/A), 
which is equal to Pr(B/A). The proof is as follows: 
1 Pr((¬A ˅ B)/A) = Pr(B/A) since Pr(¬A/A) + Pr(B/A) = Pr(B/A)
2 Pr(A ⊃ B/A) = Pr(B/A)
From 1, given that ¬A ˅ B is logically equivalent to A 
⊃ B
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This is plausible since the probability that ‘if the match is struck, it will light’ given that ‘the 
match is struck’ is intuitively the same as the probability that the match will light given that is 
struck. In other words, our willingness to accept a material conditional given that its 
antecedent is true is the same as the probability of its consequent given its antecedent.  
Now, the fact that Pr(A → B) = Pr(B/A) implies that Pr(A → B) = Pr(B) is perfectly 
intuitive if TE tracks our inferential disposition to employ A → B on a modus ponens. To 
support this, I propose the following proof: 
From the proof above it follows that Pr(A → B) is tantamount to Pr(A → B/A), which is less 
or equal to Pr(B). The point of this argument is that if Pr(A → B) = Pr(B) is counter-intuitive, 
Pr(A → B) ≤ Pr(B/A) should be equally counter-intuitive, but it isn’t. To see why Pr(A → B) ≤ 
Pr(B) is not counter-intuitive, we only need to consider that Pr(A → B) is tantamount to Pr((A 
⊃ B)/A) given the acceptance of TE, which is less or equal to Pr(B). The probability of ‘if the 
match is struck, it will light’ given that ‘the match is struck’ is less or equal to the probability 
that ‘the match will light’. This is perfectly acceptable. Therefore, Pr(A → B) = Pr(B) 
shouldn’t be considered counter-intuitive given the acceptance of TE.    
Someone could object that proof has a weak link. It assumes that Pr(A ⊃ B/A) = Pr(A → 
B), but the relationship between the material conditional and natural language conditionals is 
widely controversial. In fact, the majoritarian position is that conditionals cannot be material 
since they can’t be vacuously true when their antecedent is false, e.g., we don’t think that ‘If 
the moon is made of cheese, today is Thursday’ is true just because the moon is not made of 
cheese. But this is the conclusion we should endorse if conditionals were material.  
This objection can be answered by observing that while the equivalence between A → B 
and A ⊃ B is controversial, it is widely accepted that A ⊃ B behaves like A → B when A is 
true, because in these cases the conditional cannot be vacuously true due to the falsity of the 
antecedent. Since we are considering a circumstance in which A is assumed as true, the 
scepticism about the use of the material conditional is neutralised 
Another strategy is to resort to a similar result that doesn’t involve the material 
conditional . We can prove that the probability of any conditional given its antecedent equals 1
the conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent. All that is needed is 
assuming that (A → B) & A ≡ (A & B). This assumption is minimal; it amounts to the 
1 Pr(A → B) = Pr(B/A) TE
2 Pr(B/A) = Pr((¬A ˅ B)/A) since Pr(¬A/A) + Pr(B/A) = Pr(B/A)
3 Pr((¬A ˅ B)/A) = Pr((A ⊃ B)/A) given that A ⊃ B is logically equivalent to ¬A ˅ B
4 Pr(A → B) = Pr((A ⊃ B)/A) from 1 and 3
5 (A ⊃ B) & A ⊨ B given the validity of modus ponens
6 Pr((A ⊃ B)/A) ≤ Pr(B) from 5, for it is irrational to be more confident of 
the premises than of the conclusion
7 Pr(A → B) ≤ Pr(B) from 4 and 6
 Ellis (1984: 58).1
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generally accepted assumption that if A and B are both true, A → B is true. From this 
assumption we can prove that Pr(A → B) = Pr(B/A). The proof is as follows: For any 
conditional that satisfies the robustness requirement, i.e., the principle that A → B is 
acceptable when B is robust with respect to A, i.e., when Pr(B) is high and would remain high 
after learning that A , Pr(A → B/A) and Pr(A → B) need to be high. Pr(A → B/A) equals Pr((A 2
→ B) & A))/Pr(A). Since the probability is considered given the assumption that A is the case, 
the fact that A is assumed in conjunction with A → B does not affect its probability. From (A 
→ B) & A ≡ (A & B) it follows that (A → B) & A ≡ A & B. Thus, Pr(A → B/A) equals Pr(A & 
B)/Pr(A), which by the definition of conditional probability equates to Pr(B/A) . Since the 3
assumption that Pr(A → B/A) = Pr(B/A) leads to the conclusion that Pr(A → B/A) equals 
Pr(B), the same conclusion follows: the triviality result is not counter-intuitive.  
3. THE REAL PROBLEM OF THE EQUATION 
The triviality result was interpreted for many purposes. Lewis himself interpreted the result as 
a proof that no conditional connective will have its truth conditions measured by the 
conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent . Edgington argued that since 4
TE encompass our intuitions about conditionals truth-conditions, and there is no connective 
that can satisfy TE, we should conclude that conditionals have no truth-conditions . Both 5
interpretations miss the target. TE doesn’t express our semantic intuitions about conditionals’ 
truth-conditionals, but our willingness to employ a conditional on a modus ponens. The 
assumption that Pr(A → B) = Pr(B/A) is just a different ways to express the assumption that A 
→ B is true if we are willing to infer B from A, i.e., if we are willing to employ A → B in a 
modus ponens (EM). This provides us with another reason to reject TE. If EM is false, so is 
TE.   
It could be argued that EM results in many false negatives, since some conditionals are 
accepted only when we are willing to employ A → B in modus tollens: e.g., ‘If John's 
speaking the truth, I'm a Dutchman’. This conditional can be perfectly reasonable when John 
is lying, but it is not employable in a modus ponens. If it turns out that John is speaking the 
truth, I won’t infer that I’m a Dutchman. I would rather abandon the conditional. Another 
false negative concerns the deceiving wife’s case. The conditional ‘If my wife is deceiving 
me, I will never know’ is acceptable, because my wife is too smart to get caught. However, if 
I discover that she is deceiving me, I would not infer that I would never know; I would 
abandon the conditional.  
Thus, TE is acceptable only if is interpreted as follows: A → B is acceptable if, and only 
if, our disposition to employ it in an inference is compatible with the reasons that lead us to 
accept it in the first place. TE is not particularly impressive in this new form. It is trivially 
true that in most cases our inferential dispositions are determined by our reasons to accept a 
conditional, but that is not a universal principle, as the deceiving wife case makes clear.   
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